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Does the Free Exercise of Religion
Have a Future in the Marketplace of
Public Education in the United States?
Charles ]. Russo

INTRODUCTION
According to the first sixteen words of the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution, enacted in 1791 as part of the Bill of Rights, represent- /
ing its first ten amendments, "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." ] Viewed
synoptically, the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses, respectively, as
they have come to be known, contain an igherent conflict. On the one
hand, Americans are free to believe what they wish. On the other hand,
the Supreme Court and lower courts have made it equally as clear that if
religious practices violate the law or have been stricken down as unconstitutional, such as when school officials invite religious leaders or others
to pray at graduation ceremonies or the government provides unacceptable forms of aid to students who attend religiously affiliated non-public
schools, then individuals or groups can be restrained from acting on their
religious convictions. 2
The American judiciary has adopted a near schikophr~njc attltlH;\e toward
the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses. For instance, the Supreme
Court has passed through three stages with regard to the constitutionality
of aid to religiously affiliated non-public schools and their students, largely
allowing selected forms of assistance; the Court is currently in the third of
these as it has looked favorably on providing assistance to religious schools
and their students. Conversely, the Court has been consistently invalidated
state-sponsored prayer and religious expression in public schools. The lack
of judicial clarity in this area, coupled with what some interpret as judicial
hostility, in preventing these practices, has led to the near banishment of
religious activities in many public schools. This conflicted state of affairs
with regard to the religion clauses resulted largely from the Court's inabil- v
ity to create separate, distinct standards when dealing with the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses.
Against this background, then, the remainder of this chapter, which is
divided into three sections, serves as an introduction to a discussion of the
status of religious freedom whether involving prayer and a variety of issues
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involving religious activities in schools in the United States. Although the
second part of the book consists of chapters on the relationship between
education, law, and religion in selected nations from around the world, this
chapter does not review the various interna.tional documents on religious
freedom 3 slllce Amencan courts are unwdllllg to apply them III domestic
situations. 4 Instead, the final chapter, which provides comparative analyses
of the issues discussed herein will also refer to these documents.
After a brief history of religious freedom in the United States in the modern era, beginning with Everson v. Board of Education,s wherein the Court
upheld a statute from New Jersey permitting parents to be reimbursed for the
cost of transporting their children to religious schools, this first part of the
chapter briefly provides an overview on litigation that has shaped religious
freedom in education in its variety of manifestations. The second section
briefly reviews three recent Supreme Court cases that reached mixed outcomes with regard to religious freedom. In the first of two disputes directly
impacting on religion, Christian Legal Society v. Martinez (Christian Legal
Society),6 a divided Court arguably placed a severe restriction on religious
freedom when it affirmed that officials at a public law school in California
could implement a policy requiring an on-campus religious group to admit
all comers from the student body, including those who disagreed with its
beliefs, as a condition to becoming a recognized student organization.
A year later, in the second case, Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran
Church and School v. Equal Employment Opportunities Commission
Hosanna-Tabor (Hosanna-Tabor, EEOC)/ a unanimous Court rejected
the claim of the EEOC in relying on both religion clauses in prohibiting the
government from applying generally applicable non-discrimination laws
to the relationship between religious organizations and their ministers. As
such, the Court gave a boost to religious freedom in recognizing that officials in a Lutheran school had the right to decide who qualifies as one of
their ministers.
These two cases, one restricting religious freedom, the other protecting
this essential right, reflect the growing tension as the United States with
regard to the status of religious freedom, the subject of the third part of this
chapter. In a third case United States v. Windsor (Windsor), 8 some of the
Court's comments in striking down the federal Defense of Marriage Act,
which defined marriage as a union between one man and woman, should
raise questions for defenders of religious freedom in a multi-cultural pluralistic society. The chapter rounds out with a brief conclusion.

BACKGROUND
At the outset, it is important to note that this chapter does not advocate
for direct forms of financial aid or for the inclusion of sectarian prayer and
religious activities in public schools. Rather, this chapter maintains that the
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courts, and educators, should adopt a more even-handed approach to religion, especially Christianity, when evaluating the constitutionality of such
activities under Establishment and Free Exercise Clause ana lysis, recogniz- ..., /
ing that allowing individuals the freedom to express their faiths is not the
same as imposing a state religion.
J
Questions about the Supreme Court's even-handedness when dealing
with religion can be traced to its reliance on the Jeffersonian metaphor of
the 'wall of separation'9 between church and state. This notion of separation, which relies on wOLds tbat a.r.~not in the- Constitution and is at the
heart of the Supreme Court's First Amendment jurisprudence, entered its
educational lexicon as a kind of Trojan horse in Everson v. Board of Education (Everson).l0
In Everson, the Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Hugo Black, a former member of the Ku Klux Klan and its virulently anti-Catholic attitudes,!1
upheld a statute from New Jersey that allowed local school boards to reimburse parents for the cost of transporting their children to religiously affiliated non-public schools. In so doing, an argument can be made that in light
of his attitude towards Roman Catholicism, Black sowed the seeds for a Trojan Horse of sorts in taking the first step toward the erection of the "wall
of separation" between church and when he wrote that "[i]n the words of
Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to
erect 'a wall of separation between Church and State."'12
The Supreme Court has relied on this fateful metaphor of the wa ll since
its inception. Unlike its jurisprudence with regard to state aid to religiously
affiliated non-public schools, which has allowed more or less assistance
primarily depending on the composition of the High Court Bench, the J us- J j
tices have consistently opposed any kind of state-sponsored prayer and/or
-religious activity in schools.
The Supreme Court's modern Establishment Clause jurisprudence with
regard to state aid in the context of K-12 educatioo....e.YOlved through three _
hases. Q..illigg the fi~~_which began with Everson, and ended with
Boara of Education v Allen,13 the Justices upheld a state law mandating the loans of textbooks in secular subjects for students in religiously
affi liated non-public schools, the Court enunciated the Child Benefit Test
which is premised on the notion that such aid primarily benefits children rather that their religiously affiliated non-public schools. The years
between Lemon v. Kurtzman,14 in 1971 and Aguilar v. Felton,1 5 in 1985
in which the Court struck down the on-site delivery of Title I services to
students in their religiously affiliated non-public schools, were the low
point as to the Chi ld Benefit Test as the Justices refused to move beyond
the limits they created in Everson and Allen. However, starting in 1993
with Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District,16 in which the Court
permitted the on-site delivery of specia l education services to a student in
his religiously affiliated non-public high school, the Justices reinvigorated
the Child Benefit Test.
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Beginning! ? with Engel v. Vitale,! 8 in 1962 its first case on prayer in
public schools, the Supreme Court has consis~ently invalidated attempts
at bringing religion into public education, striking down such practices
as prayer and BIble readmg,19 the POSting of the Ten Commandments in
c1assrooms, 20 a moment of silence,21 and graduation prayer. 22 The Court
also struck down student-led prayer at school-sponsored activities such as
high school football games. 23 In addition, federal circuits are split as to
whether students can lead prayer at graduations. 24 In fairness, the Court
upheld student-organized prayer and Bible study clubs under the Equal
Access Act 25 while. allowing outside religious groups to use school facilities if they are ava~lable to other, non-religious, groups, 26 a precedent that
may be in dispute m lIght of the Court's ruling in Christian Legal Society,
discussed in more detaIl below.
Along with the cases discussed below, lower federal courts, often affirming the actions of educational officials, have struck down a wide array of
Ij religiOUS, specifically Christian: activities in schools. Among these instances,
lower courts ruled that educatIOnal officials could prohibIt a student from
, writing a biography about Jesus as a historical figure since she failed to
follow her teacher's directions in completing the assignment; 2? found that
educators did not violate a second-grade student's First Amendment rights
to freedom of religion in preventing her from showing a videotape of herself singing a religious song to classmates during show-and-tell;28 ordered
a high school student to remove Christian religious messages from a mural
she painted as part of a school-wide beautification project;29 and prevented
a board from allowing a public school graduation to occur in a church
which displayed an array of Christian symbols on the basis that doing so
would appear as an endorsement of Christianity. 30
Constitutional uncertainty over the place of prayer and/or religious activity in schools can be traced to Lemon v. Kurtzman (Lemon), the Court's
most significant case in the history of church-state relations. In Lemon,
the Court invalidate~ statutes from Pennsylvania that called for the pur- j
chase of secular servICes and Rhode Island that basically provIded salary
supplements for teachers in religiously affiliated non-public schools. In its
far-reaching opinion, the Court relied on two of its then recent decisions in
creating the seemingly ubiquitous tripartite Lemon test. The Court combined the two-part purpose and effect test that it created in School District
of Abington Township v. Schempp and Murray v. Curlett,1! invalidating
prayer and Bible reading in public schools by adding the excessive entanglement test from Walz v. Tax Commission of the City of New, 32 wherein
it upheld a law which provided state property tax exemptions for church
property used in worship services. The Court wrote that:

'I-

Every analysis in this area must begin with consideration of the cumulative criteria developed by the Court over many years. Three such tests
may be gleaned from our cases. First, the statute must have a secular
legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one
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that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not
foster "an excessive government entanglement with religion." 33
The difficulty with L emon results in part from the fact that it i~
mixed metaphQr thCli traces its origins to cases involving both the EstablishmenLand Free..Exe.rdSe:::c auses MOre -specifically, Lemon's first two
parts were developed in the context of a dispute over prayer and Bible
reading in public schools while the third arose in a disagreement over tax
exemptions, essentially governmental aid, to religious institutions. Yet,
the judiciary applies the Lemon test widely, almost indiscriminately, in
disputes whether involving aid to religious institutions or prayer and religious activities and public schools.
When the Supreme Court applies the Lemon test in cases regardless of
whether they involve aid or religious activity, its failure to explain how, or
why, it is a kind of "one size fits aU" meaSUl;e to resolve disputes originatin.g
under both the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses, creates confusion
for those seeking- judicial cl~rity, if n;tconsistency. Moreover, despite the
Court's occasional dissatisfaction with the increasingly unworkable Lemon
test, it has yet to discard it in favor of a more manageable vehicle for evaluating prayer and religious activity in public schools, not to mention aid to
students and their religiously affiliated non-public schools.
Confusion generated by the Lemon test is exacerbated because as membership on the Supreme Court changes, its collective jurisprudence on the
status of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses is impacted. The
Court's jurisprudence with regard to the Establishment and Free Exercise
Clauses has been subject to modification through the creation of two later
tests. In the earlier of these two tests, Lynch v. Donnelly,34 a non-school
case, the Court permitted a Christmas display including Santa's house, a
Christmas tree, and a Nativity scene on public property.
In a concurrence in Lynch, Justice O'Connor enunciated her "endorsement test" under which "[e]ndorsement sends a message to non-adherents
that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an
accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, fa vored members
of the political community. Disapproval sends the opposite message."35 She
added that, "irrespective of government's actual purpose, [if] the practice
under review in fact conveys a message of endorsement or disapproval. ...
[a court] should render the challenged practice invalid."36 Relying on this
test, Justice Stevens' majority opinion in Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe 3? struck down prayer before high school football games in part
based on his assertion that school officials appeared to endorse religion.
Subsequently, in Lee v. Weisman, 38 a case prohibiting prayer at public school graduation ceremonies, Justice Kennedy, author of the Supreme
Court's majority opinion, enunciated the so-called psychological coercion
test. In this test, the Court feared that allowing governmental officials to
select individuals to lead prayers at the start of graduation ceremonies could
result in psychological coercion of students who, as a captive audience may

6

I

Charles]. Russo

have been forced, against their wishes, to participate in events, and were
not genuinely free to be excused from attending.
Perhaps the greatest challenge that the L emon test presents arises under
its second prong. Under this standard, any governmental action must have a
"principal or primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion."39 Yet,
in focusing on avoiding the advancement of religion, and largely ignoring practices that have the practical effect of inhibiting religious freedom, the courts
have contributed significantly to attempts ~ex<::1ude religion in:!.J2IQP_erlyJrow,
a wide array of educational activities. Against the preceding cases, the Court
recently demonstrated how its confused Establishment Clause jurisprudence
is in a state of flux with religious freedom hanging in the balance.

SUPREME COURT AND RELIGION: HOSTILITY OR INDIFFERENCE?
Insofar as the Supreme Court's rulings in Christian Legal Society and Hosanna-Tabor are reviewed in great deal in Chapter 7, this section presents a brief
review of these cases so as to put them into context on the status of religious
freedom. These cases are discussed here, along with Windsor, due to their
potential impact on the Court's evolving First Amendment jurisprudence ¥1d
by extension, the rights of all Americans to practice their faiths freely. t/
Christian Legal Society40 saw a divided Supreme Court affirm that officials at a public law school in California could implement a policy requiring
n on-campus religious group to admit all comers from the student body,
including those who disagreed with its beliefs, as a condition of becoming
a recognized student organization. The upshot is that religious groups are 7
faced with the unpalatable options of admitting individual who share their
goals in order to gain officials recognition or go off campus and forego aid
in an attempt to maintain organizational purity.
In Hosanna-Tabor,41 a rare unanimous judgment, the Supreme Court
rejected an order of the EEOC requiring officials at a Lutheran school in
Missouri to re-employ a female teacher who was dismissed due to an illness and for being a disruptive influence on the staff. The Court noted
that school officials regarded the teacher as "called," meaning that she was
called to her vocation by God. Since the teacher was essentially a ministerial
employee, the Court agreed that school officials had freedom in the interplay between the Establi shment and Free Exercise Clauses to safeguard the
school's religious liberty in selecting their own ministers. In other words,
the Court protected the school's religious freedom by agreeing that Church
leaders and, by extension, officials of faith-based institutions, retain the
freedom to apply their religious values in making hiring decisions as to who
can serve, or be identified, as ministers.
In United States v. Windsor,42 some of Justice Kennedy'S comments as
author of the Supreme Court's majority's opinion in a five-to-four order
invalidating the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA)43 send warning signals
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for religious leaders about the statu s of the Free Exercise Clause. 44 He wrote
that "[i]n determining whether a law is motived by an improper animus
or purpose, ' [d]iscriminations of an unusual character' ... require careful consideration."45 Justice Scalia took strong exception to part of Justice
Kennedy's unnecessarily provocative perspective in which the latter wrote
"that the supporters of this Act acted with malice-with the 'purpose' 'to
disparage and to injure' same-sex couples."46
Readily conceding that an analysis of same-sex marriage is beyond the
scope of this chapter and volume, it is important for proponents on both sides
of the issue to recognize that there must be room to display mutual respect
for one another based on the aphorism that people can disagree but do not
have to be disagreeable in doing so. At the same time, supporters of same-sex
marriage, such as Justice Kennedy who has an influential position as a member of the Supreme Court, should not impute a discriminatory animus on the
part of all who disagree with his position, especially when differences emerge
for those whose concerns are rooted in sincerely held religious beliefs .
In light of Windsor it is worth considering its potential impact on mainstream religious bodies that do not support same-sex marriage due to their
teachings, and their schools. Further questions may arise about the treatment of religious bodies that refuse to ordain non-celibate gays (or women,
for that matter, an admittedly different topic) as members of their clergy.
In other words, subject to the discussion in the next paragraph, it remains
to be seen whether religious institutions will have to modify the content of
their curricular or hiring practices.
A partial answer to this conundrum raised by Windsor may emerge from
Agency for International Development v. Alliance for Open Society International (Allianc e),47 resolved in the same term as Windsor. In Alliance the
Supreme Court ruled that the constitutionality of a condition on receiving a
subsidy, or in terms more applicable to religious institutions such as schools
and churches or other houses of worship, tax exemptions for themselves and
tax deductions for donors, depend s on whether the condition imposed by
the government defines or reaches outside of programs. That is, it appears
that according to Alliance, public officials cannot impose requirements on
religious organizations that would change their very nature, such as expect
them to change their doctrines and practices since these to the heart of their
sincerely held religious beliefs. Of course, it is unclear remains whether
Alliance may be used to protect religious organizations .

,...
-2

REFLECTIONS
Against a backdrop of Christian Legal Society, Hosanna-Tabor, and Windsor, it is evident that the way in which educators and the judiciary clarify the
place of prayer and/or religious activity in schools will have a major impact
on public education in the United States. Put another way, as discussed in
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the following three questions, the manner in which this debate plays out
will reveal whether the nation still cherishes the freedom of religion that
contributed so greatly to its foundation.
The first question involves the effect prong in Lemon. More specifically, if the United States is to continue fostering ongoing dialogue about
diversity of perspectives, it is imperative that the Supreme Court provide
guidance for the remainder of the federal judiciary as well as school officia ls in order to avoid the appearance of inhibiting religion, especially
in the aftermath of three recent cases that have been less than favorable
to expressions of religious belief. In the first case, C.H. ex rel. Z.H. v.
Oliva,48 schoo l officials in New Jersey forbade a first-grader from reading a religious story, "Big Fami ly," an adaptation of the Biblical story
of Jacob and Esau to classmates. Although the court fai led to reach the
merits of the claim, since it resolved the matter on procedural grounds,
the outcome is perplexing.
In the second case, Skros v. City of New York,49 the Second Circuit
upheld a policy from the board of education that allowed displays of menorahs and stars and crescents, representing Judaism and Islam respectively,
but not a manger scene. Since the Court refused to permit the display of the
manger on the basis that it was wholly religious, one must wonder whether
secular jurists are in a position to delineate between religious iconography
of different faiths, especially since Judaism and Islam forbid the use of statutes in their faiths.
Finally, in a case from California, Eklund v. Byron Union School
District, SO the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal, again on procedural
grounds, of a challenge from parents in California who questioned the
use of curricular materials on Islam. The materia ls included a simulation
unit on Islamic culture in a social studies course that, among other things,
required students to wear identification tags displaying their new Islamic
names, dress as Muslims, memorize and recite an Islamic prayer that has
the status of the Lord 's Prayer in Christianity as well as other verses from
the Quran, recite the Five Pillars of Faith, and engage in fasting and acts
of self-denial. sl Without addressing the merits of the claims, the court
determined that the activities "were not ... 'overt religious exercises' that
raise[dJ Establishment Clause concerns."S2
It is unclear how ordering the removal of a chi ld 's drawings or permitting him to read a religious story in C.H. or permitting symbols that are
closely associated with Islam and Judaism, but not Christianity, in Skoros
or having children act as if they were Islamic in Ek lund, are anything but
inconsistent, if not h.Q.stile to Christianity, since they display a lack of evenhandedness, to say the least. C.H. is particularly troubling because it is
unclear how educators officials could have thought that a chi ld 's desire to
read a religious story to his classmates, even if spurred on by his mother,
could have been attributed to the school board. Further, how the Second
Circuit in Skoros, backed by attorneys and other school officia ls from the
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New York City Board of Education, could claim that both the menorah
a~d star and crescent are wholly secular is nothing short of astounding,
rejecting the religious significance that these objects have long held. Skoros
dbemonstrates a clear lack of even-handedness in addressing religious symols and is exacerbated by the fact that the court took it upon itself to be
~he arbiter of the meaning of the iconographic images at issue, compoundIng the educators' lack of religious understanding that was evidenced in the
board's wrong-headed policy. As Justice Scalia noted in Lee, one cannot
help but wonder whether secular jurists "cannot disguise the fact that the[y
have] gone beyond the realm where judges know what they are doing,"53
In acting essentially as religious arbiters by passing judgment in areas well
beyond their competence.
Lip service over the importance of respect for differences of opinion
aside, educators and the courts must allow educational leaders in schools to
practice what they preach and do more than merely talk about inculcating
different values . At a time when values occupy a prominent role in public
debate, one ca n only wonder what message children receive in their classrooms when the courts have permitted school officials to ensure that their
schools are virtually sanitized of references to prayer and religion other
than 'appropriate' discussions in history or English classes. By imposing a
wall of silence that prevents believers from exercising their constitutional
rights, educators and the courts risk sending out the unmistakable message
to children and parents that freedom of religion is little more than a pious
platitude that can be freely ignored without consequence.
A second, closely related question concerns the paradox of how a democratic society that was founded on religious principles but continues to
preserve the Jeffersonian metaphor by maintaining the 'wall of separation'
between church and state with regard to prayer and/or religious activities,
can respect the rights of both the majority and minority. In other words,
while certainly agreeing with Justice O'Connor's salient observation that
"we do not count heads before enforcing the First Amendment,"54 in protecting the rights of the minority with regard to such potentially contentious matters as prayer and religious activity in schools, it remains to be
seen how the courts can avoid the tyranny of the minority. 55 Therefore,
finding an acceptable middle ground is essential.
When the Supreme Court struck down school-sponsored graduation
prayer in Lee v. Weisman, the majority spoke of a "mutuality of obligation"56
that safeg uards the rights of minorities . If this "mutuality of obligation" is
to have meaning, then public school officials and the courts must find a
way to accommodate the viewpoints of all, rather than stifle the religious
expression of believers. One can only question how educators expect to
foster an appreciation of diversity in all of its manifestations beyond such
demographic characteristics as race, gender, and socio-economic status if
school officials cannot tolerate expressions of religious beliefs that may not
be shared by all members of an audience or community.
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It is ironic that in a nation that values freedom of religion, the courts have
been unable to reach a consensus on the appropriateness of public prayer
and religious activity. Further, protestations to the contrary notwithstanding, schools teach values regularly, whether informing children not to cheat,
to study and work hard, not to fight, and to drink their milk. While readily
conceding that the inculcation of religious values is a familial obligation that
, is best done at home, one can only wonder what message students, especially
I those from the homes of believers, receive when they are told that they cannot
Idiscuss religion in school. This chapter recognizes that ~eas.onable observers
cannot help but to thInk that the message is of one rejectIng religIOn. The
notion that there can be no discussion of religion in schools is dubious at
best, disingenuous at worst in light of dicta in School District of Abington
Township v. Schempp and Murray v. Curlett that:
It certainly may be said that the Bible is worthy of study for its literary
and historic qualities. Nothing we have said here indicates that such
study of the Bible or of religion, when presented objectively as part of
a secular program of education, may not be effected consistently with
the First Amendment. 57

Judicial inability to formulate a measure that respects the rights of diverse
groups of believers is frustrating where educators have, as in Lee, included
well-reasoned safeguards such as selecting a religious leader from a different faith each year and providing broad-based guidelines under which
prayers may be offered.
The Supreme Court's failure to respond adequately to Justice Scalia's
salient dissent in Lee that silence in response to public prayer does not
necessarily mean assent has further exacerbated the situation. 58 By Silently/
0 istening to and perhaps even reflecting on whatever prayer is being offered,
or if a different point of view is being presented, listeners can develop a
deeper respect for perspectives other than their own, thereby enhancing the ;
presence of intellectual diversity in schools (and other locales). If students
'- can learn to maintain such a respectful stance, whether in silence as at the
graduation, or by engaging in appropriate discussion should such matters
arise in classroom settings, when exposed to ideas with which they disagree, then it could be that they, and the adults present, may have learned
a valuable lesson in tolerance.
In a nation where freedom of religion has been part of its fabric since its
founding, whether its future is in some doubt or litigation over its parameters
is the continuation of what can be described as business as usual remains
to be seen. Even so, the following chapters describe the leading issues in a
wide array of disputes relating religious freedom in the United States while
highlighting its status in selected nations throughout the world. The large
amount of litigation relating to religion in the public marketplace in education that has been litigated generally peacefully in the United States stands
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in stark contrast to the situation in much of the rest of the world, including some of the countries discussed in the second half of the book, where
religious differences are often responded to amid violence. Hopefully, then,
the issues examined in this volume will provide readers with a better understanding of religious freedom in the United States and its status in selected
nations throughout the world.

NOTES
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. In CantweLL v Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) wherein the Justices struck
down the convictions of Jehovah's Witnesses for violating a statute aga in st
the solicitation of funds for religious, charitable, or philanthropic purposes
without prior approval of public officials, the Court extended the prohibition
against the establishment of religion to state governments.
3. For a review of these documents, see Charles J. Russo, Religious Freedom
in Education: A Fundamental Human Right. RELIGION & EDUCATION (in
press).
4. For a d·iscussion of the attitudes of Supreme Court Justices on International
law, see Charles J. Russo, Judges as Umpires or Rule Makers? The Role of
the Judiciary in Educational Decision Making in the United States. 10 EDUCATION LAW JOURNAL 33 at n.50-70 (2009) and accompanying text.
5. 330 U.S. 1 (1947), reh'g denied, 330 U.S. 855 (1947).
6. Christian Legal Soc'y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010), reh'g denied,
on remand sub nom. Ch1'istian Legal Soc'y v. Wu, 626 F.3d 483 (9th Cir.
2010) .
7. 132 S. Ct. 694 (2011).
8. -U.S.-, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
9. The metaphor of the "wall of separation" was popularized by Thomas Jefferson's letter of January 1,1802, to Nehemia h Dodge, Ephraim Robbins,
and Stephen S. Nelson, "A Committee of the Danbury Baptist Association:
Thomas Jefferson," in Andrew Adgate Lipscomb & Albert Ellery Bergh,
(eds .), 16 Writings of Thomas Jefferson (1903) 281. Jefferson wrote: "their
legislature should 'make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,' thus building a wall of separation
between church and state." The metaphor of the wall traces its origins to
Roger Wi lliams who coined the term more than 150 years before Thomas
Jefferson used it in his letter to the Danbury Baptist Convention. Roger Willi ams, Mr. Cotton's Letter Lately Printed, Examined and Answered (1644),
reprinted in 1 The Comp lete Writings of Roger WiLLiams 392 (1963) ("and
when they have opened a gap in the hedge or wall of Separation between the
Garden of the Church and the Wilderness of the world .... ").
The Supreme Court first used the term in Reynolds v. United States, 98
U.S. 145, 164 (1878) when it rejected a Free Exercise Clause challenge filed
by members of the Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter Day Saints, more
commonly known as Mormons, to a federa l polygamy statute.
10. Supra, n.6
11. See, e.g., Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Federalism and Faith, 56 EMORY
L. REV. 19, n.120 (2006) (citing Philip Hamburger's Separation of Church
and State [2002) as it examines Black's history with the Ku Klux Klan and
its anti-Catholicism}.
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Supra, n.6 at 16.
392 U.S . 236 (1968).
403 U.S. 602 (1971).
473 U.S. 402 (1985).
509 U.S. 1 (1993).
Earlier, in People of State of Ill. ex rei. McCollum v. Boal'd of Educ. of Sch.
Dist. No. 71, Champaign County, 333 U.S. 203 (1948), the Court invalidated a program that permitted members of the Jewish, Roman Catholic,
and Protestant faiths to offer religion classes in public schools to children
whose parents agreed to have them take part in the program. In its other
pre-Vitale case, Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952), the Court upheld
a program from New York City that allowed officials to release students
early from their public schools so that they could attend religious classes at
other locations on the basis that this was similar to accommodating parental
wishes by granting excused absences for children who were allowed to miss
class for religious reasons.
18. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
19. Abington Township v. Schempp and Murray v. CUl'lett, 374 U.S. 203
(1963).
20. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980), re'g denied, 449 U.S. 1104 (1981), on
remand, 612 S.W.2d 133 (Ky. 1981).
21. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (invalidating a statute from Alabama
as lacking a secular purpose since its sponsors hoped that it would lead to a
return to school prayer).
22. Lee, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
23. Santa Fe, 530 U.S. 290 (2002).
24. For cases prohibiting school prayer, see, e.g., Amel'ican Civil Liberties Union
of N.J. v. Blacl~ Horse Pike Reg'l Bd. of Educ., 84 F.3d 1471 (3d Cir. 1996);
Lassonde v. Pleasanton Unified Sch. Dist., 320 F.3d 979 (9th Cil'. 2003),
cert. denied, 540 U.S. 817 (2003). For a case supporting student-led prayer
at graduation, see Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 250 F.3d 1330 (11th Cil'.
2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1065 (2001).
25. 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 4071 et seq.
26. See Lamb's Chapel v. Centel' Moriches Union Fl'ee Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384
(1993), on remand, 17 F.3d 1425 (2d Cil'. 1994) (permitting a religious group
to show a film series on child-rearing in a school facility); Good News Club
v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001) (allowing a non-school-sponsored
club to meet during non-class hours so that members and moderators could
discuss child-rearing along with character, and moral, development from a
religious perspective since officials permitted other groups to address simi lar
topics from secular perspectives).
27. Settle v. Dickson County Sch. Bd., 53 F.3d 152 (6th Cil'. 1995), cert. denied,
516 U.S. 989 (1995). While the teacher was free to set the parameters for
assignments, she might have turned the event into a teachable moment,
rather than litigation, had she pointed out that in addition to the Bible, the
first century Roman historians Pliny and Tacitus reponed on the existence of
Jesus.
28. DeNooyel'v. Livona Pub. Schs., 799 F. Supp. 744 (E.D. Mich. 1992), aff'd
sub nom. Denooyer v. Mel'inelli, 1 F.3d 1240 (6th Cil'. 1993), reh'g denied,
opinion superseded without published opinion, 12 F.3d 211 (6th Cil'. 1993),
cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1031 (1994).
29. Bannon v. School Dist. of Palm Beach County, 387 F.3d 1208 (11th Cir.
2004), Rehearing and reh'g en banc denied, 125 Fed.Appx 984 (11th Cir.
2004), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 811 (2005).

-----=-Does the Free Exercise of Religion Have a Future?

13

Doe v. Elmbrook Sch. Dist. , 687 F.3d 840 (7th Cir. 2012).
374 U.S. 203 (1963).
397 U.S. 664 (1970).
Lemon, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). In reviewing entanglement and state
aid to religiously affiliated schools, most often in the context of providing aid,
the Court identified three add itional factors that must be taken into consideration: "[wJe must examine the character and purposes of the institutions that
are benefitted, the nature of the aid that the State provides, and the resulting
relationship between the government and religious authority" (at 615).
34. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
35. Id. at 687-88.
36. Id . at 690.
37. 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
38.505 U.S. 577 (1992).
39. Id .
40. -U.S.-, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010), on remand sub nom Christian Legal Soc'y
v. Wu, 626 F.3d 483 (9th Cir. 2010).
41. -U.S.-, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2011).
42. -U.S.-, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
43.28 U.S.c. § 1738C.
44. On the same day, in Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013), on
remand,-F.3d-, 2013 WL 3991967 (9th Cir. 2013), the Supreme Court
invalidated a voter-enacted state constitutional amendment in California
defining a valid marriage as one between a man and a woman on the basis
that its proponents lacked standing to sue.
45. Winsdor, supra, n.6 at 2693 (internal citations omitted).
46. Justice Sca lia's response added that "[tJhe Court says that the motivation for
DOMA was to "demean"; to "impose inequality"; to "impose .. . a stigma";
to deny people "equal dignity "; to brand gay people as "unworthy"; and to
"humiliat[eJ." Windsor, supra, n.9 at 2708 (interna l citations and emph asis
added deleted). Of course, he disagreed .
47. -U.S.-, 133 S. Ct. 2321 (2013).
48 . 226 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2000), cert. denied sub nom. Hood v. Medford Twp.
Bd. of Educ., 533 U.S. 915 (2001).
49. 437 F.3d 1 (2d Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1205 (2007).
50. 154 Fed.Appx. 648 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 942 (2006).
51. Ek lund v. Byron Union Sch. Dist., 2006 WL 1519184 (Appellate Petition, Motion and Filing) (U.S. 2006). Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (No.
05-1539) at 3-13.
52 . Eklund v. Byron Union Sch. Dist., 154 Fed.Appx. 648 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal citations omitted).
53 . Lee, 505 U.S . 577, 636 (Scalia J., dissenting) (1992).
54. McCreary County, 545 U.S. 844, 884 (O'Connor J., concurring) (2005).
55. As a rhetorical side, if, as Justice O'Connor suggested in McCreary, "we do
not count heads in a room," one can wonder why so many Supreme Court
cases are decided by five-to-four margins, essentially allowing one Justice to
make law for the nation?
56. Lee, 505 U.S. 577, 591 (1992).
57. 374 U.S. 203,225 (1963) .
58 . Lee, 505 U.S. 577, 637 et seq. (Scali a J., dissenting) (1992).

30 .
31.
32.
33.

~~====--~================~---

